Free will
another piece of homework...
please note that homework constrains what i can say
i wanted to say much more...
Determinism seems to undermine free will. If everything in our body is caused by the environment, then wouldn’t we be just like any other piece of matter in the universe? Blindly and hopelessly obeying the laws of physics and causality, and not have free will?
No, we have free will. A simple proof would be to decide among a few choices, which we do all the time. But the argument against free will still needs to be refuted.
No free will means that the self does not direct itself. Determinism implicitly assumes that the self is the final result at the end of a causal chain that is the body. Because of universal causality, and because we are material, our body is subjected to the law of causality, and thus by obeying the physical laws of the universe, our bodies lead through cause and effect to a result that is our self. Our will is therefore caused. And we have no free will.
But the assumption that we are merely the result of the processes in our bodies or brain is wrong. We are our whole body, not its result. But the determinist would still insist that, even though we are our entire bodies, our bodies are caused by the environment, and so we are not free anyway. However, that is still merely thinking that our bodies are the result of the environment. The proper way to conceive of the body is to think of it as a system.
A system is matter interacting in an organized fashion giving rise to emergent properties that does not exist in any part in any of its parts. A system therefore exists in no part in any of its parts. The system is the system as a whole. The system is thus in a sense, immaterial. It is not the matter and energy interplay, but the organization and emergent properties that results. Parts of the system no doubt obey completely the laws of causality. But that does not mean that the system is determined. Because the system is the emergent entity that arises from the interactions of its parts, the system determines itself.
An example would be the Great Red Spot of Jupiter. The Great Red Spot is not the gas that is its contents. It is the immaterial system that arises from material gasses. It is the result of the interactions of the gasses. Not the gas being what it is. Because of temperature and pressure, the system moves gasses about in a spiral. Even though some gas exit the system, and some enter it. It will always be the Great Red Spot. The Great Red Spot is the system, not its contents. Likewise our bodies are systems. The material that makes up our bodies change roughly every seven years. But does that then mean our bodies are not our bodies anymore? That would be absurd.
Common sense rightly tells us that we have free will. But it gives us the wrong reasons for thinking so. We intuitively think we are somehow separate from our body. And that our will directs our body. This intuition is so innate that even when we consider our brain to be entirely based on material reality, we commit the same fallacy. We always think of ourselves as separate from our own selves, and from the outside, as if we exist outside at all. For example, when we think of our brain, we picture it functioning as if it is some other common material object. We see the ion flows, the neurotransmitter exchanges at the synapses, neurons firing etc. and that somehow all that results in consciousness. Forgetting that all that is consciousness. And that we are not some entity outside of the system of the brain. And that we are committing the fallacy of begging the question; in trying to argue that the mind is outside the brain, we assume that the mind is outside the brain.
However, the argument that our will is a system based on a material reality has unproven assumptions as well. It assumes a material basis for the mind. If our mind exists somewhere outside reality, then perhaps it is not free there?
There is currently an explanatory gap between the physical processes in the brain and consciousness. Critics therefore argue that it is a huge leap assuming the mind to have physical basis in the brain. Yet the critics are too committing the fallacy of expecting to perceive qualia from outside of the system that is the brain. They put forth silly challenges such as licking the brain to taste the flavor of chocolate that the person in the brain is experiencing. Sense leads to perception and is experienced by consciousness. Sense cannot be sensed. Perception cannot be perceived. Experience cannot be experienced. Instead physical phenomena are sensed; and sensation is perceived and experienced by consciousness that no other entity can be conscious of except itself. So it does not mean that the system of the brain is not the mind. There is an explanatory gap, but it cannot be used to disprove the mind as brain processes.
John Searle proposes the Chinese Room Argument, where he tries to show that syntax is not sufficient for semantics. In the Chinese room, a man who does not understand Chinese is supplied with a rulebook for manipulation of Chinese symbols. When given Chinese symbols, the man would use the rulebook to formulate a reply. From the outside, it would seem that the room understands Chinese. But Searle shows us that in actuality the man does not understand Chinese. There are many counter-arguments against the Chinese Room Argument. But they miss what the Chinese Room is arguing against. The Chinese Room is to show that the mind cannot be a digital computer. Not that the mind cannot have a material basis. Computers, being algorithmic in nature, can never match the complexity and potential of the brain. Strong AI proponents assume that the mind is the software where the brain is hardware. But underlying syntax is the processing of syntax, which requires a processor which is a system. It is questionable basing a theory on another theory which’s basis is simply ignored. They confuse simulation with actual functioning of the brain. Why introduce two systems, one relying on the other, and making the whole proposition somewhat shaky in the process, when only one would do? We can surely adopt the principle of parsimony here. The question is not what syntax the mind is based on, since whatever the syntax, there still needs to be a syntax processor. It is what system the mind is based on. Basically the mind is arises directly from the system of the brain, and requires no syntax whatsoever. Therefore, Searle’s Chinese Room argument cannot be used against a material basis for the mind.
There is no reason to choose a material basis for the mind if other theories are equally convincing. But they are not. We therefore have to accept that the mind has a material basis. And because it exists as a system, it is therefore free. And we have free will.
please note that homework constrains what i can say
i wanted to say much more...
Determinism seems to undermine free will. If everything in our body is caused by the environment, then wouldn’t we be just like any other piece of matter in the universe? Blindly and hopelessly obeying the laws of physics and causality, and not have free will?
No, we have free will. A simple proof would be to decide among a few choices, which we do all the time. But the argument against free will still needs to be refuted.
No free will means that the self does not direct itself. Determinism implicitly assumes that the self is the final result at the end of a causal chain that is the body. Because of universal causality, and because we are material, our body is subjected to the law of causality, and thus by obeying the physical laws of the universe, our bodies lead through cause and effect to a result that is our self. Our will is therefore caused. And we have no free will.
But the assumption that we are merely the result of the processes in our bodies or brain is wrong. We are our whole body, not its result. But the determinist would still insist that, even though we are our entire bodies, our bodies are caused by the environment, and so we are not free anyway. However, that is still merely thinking that our bodies are the result of the environment. The proper way to conceive of the body is to think of it as a system.
A system is matter interacting in an organized fashion giving rise to emergent properties that does not exist in any part in any of its parts. A system therefore exists in no part in any of its parts. The system is the system as a whole. The system is thus in a sense, immaterial. It is not the matter and energy interplay, but the organization and emergent properties that results. Parts of the system no doubt obey completely the laws of causality. But that does not mean that the system is determined. Because the system is the emergent entity that arises from the interactions of its parts, the system determines itself.
An example would be the Great Red Spot of Jupiter. The Great Red Spot is not the gas that is its contents. It is the immaterial system that arises from material gasses. It is the result of the interactions of the gasses. Not the gas being what it is. Because of temperature and pressure, the system moves gasses about in a spiral. Even though some gas exit the system, and some enter it. It will always be the Great Red Spot. The Great Red Spot is the system, not its contents. Likewise our bodies are systems. The material that makes up our bodies change roughly every seven years. But does that then mean our bodies are not our bodies anymore? That would be absurd.
Common sense rightly tells us that we have free will. But it gives us the wrong reasons for thinking so. We intuitively think we are somehow separate from our body. And that our will directs our body. This intuition is so innate that even when we consider our brain to be entirely based on material reality, we commit the same fallacy. We always think of ourselves as separate from our own selves, and from the outside, as if we exist outside at all. For example, when we think of our brain, we picture it functioning as if it is some other common material object. We see the ion flows, the neurotransmitter exchanges at the synapses, neurons firing etc. and that somehow all that results in consciousness. Forgetting that all that is consciousness. And that we are not some entity outside of the system of the brain. And that we are committing the fallacy of begging the question; in trying to argue that the mind is outside the brain, we assume that the mind is outside the brain.
However, the argument that our will is a system based on a material reality has unproven assumptions as well. It assumes a material basis for the mind. If our mind exists somewhere outside reality, then perhaps it is not free there?
There is currently an explanatory gap between the physical processes in the brain and consciousness. Critics therefore argue that it is a huge leap assuming the mind to have physical basis in the brain. Yet the critics are too committing the fallacy of expecting to perceive qualia from outside of the system that is the brain. They put forth silly challenges such as licking the brain to taste the flavor of chocolate that the person in the brain is experiencing. Sense leads to perception and is experienced by consciousness. Sense cannot be sensed. Perception cannot be perceived. Experience cannot be experienced. Instead physical phenomena are sensed; and sensation is perceived and experienced by consciousness that no other entity can be conscious of except itself. So it does not mean that the system of the brain is not the mind. There is an explanatory gap, but it cannot be used to disprove the mind as brain processes.
John Searle proposes the Chinese Room Argument, where he tries to show that syntax is not sufficient for semantics. In the Chinese room, a man who does not understand Chinese is supplied with a rulebook for manipulation of Chinese symbols. When given Chinese symbols, the man would use the rulebook to formulate a reply. From the outside, it would seem that the room understands Chinese. But Searle shows us that in actuality the man does not understand Chinese. There are many counter-arguments against the Chinese Room Argument. But they miss what the Chinese Room is arguing against. The Chinese Room is to show that the mind cannot be a digital computer. Not that the mind cannot have a material basis. Computers, being algorithmic in nature, can never match the complexity and potential of the brain. Strong AI proponents assume that the mind is the software where the brain is hardware. But underlying syntax is the processing of syntax, which requires a processor which is a system. It is questionable basing a theory on another theory which’s basis is simply ignored. They confuse simulation with actual functioning of the brain. Why introduce two systems, one relying on the other, and making the whole proposition somewhat shaky in the process, when only one would do? We can surely adopt the principle of parsimony here. The question is not what syntax the mind is based on, since whatever the syntax, there still needs to be a syntax processor. It is what system the mind is based on. Basically the mind is arises directly from the system of the brain, and requires no syntax whatsoever. Therefore, Searle’s Chinese Room argument cannot be used against a material basis for the mind.
There is no reason to choose a material basis for the mind if other theories are equally convincing. But they are not. We therefore have to accept that the mind has a material basis. And because it exists as a system, it is therefore free. And we have free will.
posted by zcer at 1:08 AM
1 Comments:
I watched a lecture on TV (cable expands to benefit scientists), and they were investigating decision making in monkeys. I won't go into details, but the conclusion was that the mind has the ability to take two options (in there experiment is was choosing a red and green button) and integrate the probabilities associated with both based on experience from the senses. Like for example, choosing a green button gives the monkey a banana, so the mind will integrate more good tasting with the green button rather then the red with few benefits to the senses.
I might add also that determinism is a misused term. I understand it is "an entity whose future is defined and cannot be changed." Others would say "an entity who's existence is already been decided by God" I'm not going to elaborate on either of these definitions. The future will eventually be present or past. We attain knowledge of this present or past, but can we know the future? I think this is the real question. If we said "yes", our world is deterministic. Say we know every physical law and have an intimate knowledge of every object in the universe, then we can predict exactly what one object will do from the effects from the surrounding objects. On the other hand, if we said "no", this means that intimate knowledge of everything is impossible and there are no "laws for everything". Scientist and philosophers have yet to confidently say one or the other! Reason is simple, we have yet to prove it because we don't have the law for everything.
(A side note: quantum mechanics says that nature is adherently probabilistic, and that one cannot possibly know what everything will do nor where everything will be. Although quantum mechanics is no where close to a complete description of the universe, it is a hint to the nature of reality) Personally I will side with free will only with the sense that from a very fundamental standpoint and excluding any "Godlike" forces, I can make choices.
OK, sorry this is long, these are just thoughts.
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